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Finns  re unlikely tO provide their employees wh  genra
waining  that makes theW'more  desble  to comptng  frms.
They are  more  likely,  to pvide  such trining if it is difficult  for
other firms  to masure the value  of the taning.
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One  widely  accepted  conclusion  in the  human  lNSs  Incrred in rmanIng,  with fth  taining firm
capita literature  on training  is that  fims will  at a wage  below  the  muket-level  for his  skill. In
finance  only  finn-specific  training  because  it is  such  cases  tins  constrant  an worker  mobility
non-transferable  to other  firms.  Finns  will  not  wil make  it feasible  for ft'As  to assume  a share
be wlling  to fince  tining  In geeral (as-  in Imemt  in the  oenera-skills  training  of
ferable)  skills  their  workers  - a result-that  qualifies-the
traditional  theory  of oh-nth-job  training  as
In ths paper  It Is argued  that a  tenrit  develoed by Recker.
fnan will possess  only limited  knowledge  of the
ainn-t  ingleve  in gener  killsU  acquired  by  TtIs  mesult  may  have some imporatm
workers  in  othe finns. Hence  a woreer with  i  for policy  in countering  t  delete-
transferable skills who changes employer can  nous effects of such market imperfections as
expec to suffer  a cut  is  wages for a transition  minmum wage  legslation and a restri
period  while  his level of productivity  is being  capital  market,  on the supply  of trintd  labor
evaluated  and recognized.  Such a worker  has no  with general  skills. It also suggests  that trning
incentive  to move  as long as the pesent value of  certification,  in facilitaft  ingnterfim  aobility,
the loss in eamings  during the probadonary  discourages  on-tbe-job  tr  by fis.
period  is gr  erthan the present  value of the
This paper  is a product  of the Educadon  and Employment  Division,  Popuation and
HumanResoures Depamtment  Copies  are  available  fre  frGm  the  Wold Bank, 1818
H Street  NW, Washington  DC 20433. Please  contactrCynthia  Cristobal,  moom  S6-
035. extension  33640.
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Becke  !  se  minal  work regarding  on-th.-job  ttaining,  with  his  f  aous
distinction  between  '6gaeral'  and  'speocificL  training,  has  Led to  the
emergence  of  a  w4ole  new field  of  research  into  the-economics  of  training
within  the  fira  (Decker  1975).  Working with  a  model  of  a  perfectly
competitive  firm,  Becker  defined  as  completely  speclfic  those  forms  of
training  which  increase  the  pr  ductivity  of  s  trainee  in  the  firm  providing
the  training,  but  which  do  not  at  all  raise  the  worker's  productivity  in  other
firms.  General  training,  on  the  otheit'hand,  was defined  as  raising  the
worker's  productivity  in  both  the  training  firo  and  other  firms.
The upshot  of  RScker's.  model  is  that  firms  have  no  incentive  to-
invest  in  general  training.  Being  enbodied  in  the  trained  workors  and  of
potential  value  to  other  firms,  such  training  will  tend  to  cause  workers  to
move to  other  firms  after  being  trained  if  they  do  not  recoive  a  wage equal  to
their  enhanced  marginal  product.  Hence,  the  training  firm  cannot  hold  on  to
this  form  of  investment  if  it  is  to  be  profitable  oad  will  not  undertake  lt.
One major  implication  of  thls  result  (which  goe"  a  long  way in
explaining  a  wide  variety  of  labor  market  phenomena)  is  that'>general  training
-Slll,  in  general,  have  to  be  paid  for  by  the  trainees  themselves.  Since  such
workers  moy  be  poor  or  illiquid  and  have  little  access  to  the  capital  market,
the  payment  to  the  fiLr  for  this  traLinng  will  often  take  the  form  of  reduced
earnings  during  the  training  period.  /  Only  to  the  extent  that  training  is
specific  will  the  firm  be  prepared  to  bear  the  burden  of  at  least  part  of  the
training  expenses.
Becker  argued  that  a  unity  of  interests  between  the  traLning  firm
and  the  worker  would,  in  practice,  lead  to  a sharing  between  the  two  partles
of  both  the  costs  of  specific  training  and  the  returns  stemming  therefrom.2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
The view  of  firm-pecific  on-the-job  trai*in  as a  shared  investment  be8  en
worker  and  employer  is  now  gonerally  accepted  as  a  central  element  In  the
human  capLtAl  model.2/ However,  for  genral training,  no  uec sharing
arrangement  is  viewed  as fesIble,  other  then  in  such  special  market
circumstances  such  as  monopsony.  This  absence  of  a  mutA*ally  boneficial
agreement  occurs  becauae  the  costless  potential  nobility  of  generally  trained
workers  means  that  the  training  firm  catmot  ansure  that  the  worker  will  remain
with  the  firm  beyond  his  training  period,  if  he  is  paid  less  than  his  marginal
product.  Hence  the  firm  cannot  recoup  any  potential  investments  in  general
training.  Only  where  there  is  som  degree  of  iimobility  of  labor  may  firms  be
able  to  collect  part  of  the  extra  product  of  general  training  (see  Eckaus,
1963).3/
On the  other  hand,  since  an  agreement  will  in  general  emerge  for
specific  training,  such  training  has  lent  itself  to  being  applied  to  a  wide
range  of  issues  in  labor  economics  theory,  particularly  in  relation  to  the
micro  economics  of  the  firm. 4/  In  contrasxt,  application  of  the  concept  of
general  training  to  the  theory  of  the  firm  has  been  more  bAited.5/  This  is
presumably  due  to  the  unlikely  achieveaent  of  a  general  training  agreement
between  the  firm  and  its  workers.
In  this  paper,  we  take  a  view  that  leads  to  a  different  conclusion.
We assume  that  potential  recruiting  firma  have  less  information  regarding  a
worker's  training  than  the  firm  providing  the  trainiuV,.,  This  asymmetry  of
information  concerning  the  general  training  received  by  workers  negates  one  of
the  central  assumptions  of  the  Becker  model,  i.e.  that  the  transferability  of
generally  trained  workers  between  firms  is  costless  to  the  worker.  Once  such
a  transfer  is  seen  as  costly  to  trained  workers  we  are  led  to  the  result  that3
tianling  firms  Cj=  "sume an  active  role  in  the  inVestment  in  general
training.  This  ln  turn  endows  tbe  genral  traLning  concept  with  a  contral
role  (potentially  no  less  signlflcant  than  that  of  specifie  training)  ln the
theory  of  the  firm.
In  Section  11  we  present  our  basic  model  regaroing  the  behavior  of  a
recrulting  firm  in  the  face  of  imperfact  information.  In  Section  III  the
behavior  of  the  training  firm  is  examlned.  In  Section  IV  some  extensLons  and
complications  are  considered,  including  the  issue  of  natutal  ability.e  . -,  II.
,  C
. t  ,.  .
. -nlke  fo  LAl  bchooling, on-the-job  training  Is  essentially
bZteVogeeo*s  and  typica4ly  difficult  to  ,fline.  Indmed,  on-the-job  training
teds  to  be  informal  aid  hard  t6  masure,  is  often  tallor-made  for  idiviaual
workers,  ne¶  steadily  leading  to  certlficatlon  on  completion.  While  aiso
relevant  to  job  entry-level  training,  tiaer*  characteristics  are  particularly
applicable  to  theb wole  complex  of  contimnous  training  and  skill  dEvelopm_nt
measures -that  firms  provide  for  their  workers,  Including  training  for
perfomuame  upgrading,  skills  renewal  and  career  developseat.  As a  result  of
these  characteristics,  and  particularly  a  lack  of  training  certification,
outsiders  to  a  firm  aici  provides  sy5h  training  will  find  it  difLiicat  and
costly  to  determine  the  ixteut  and  coverage  of  the  on-the-job  traLning,
particularly  continLuos  training,  provided  by  such  a  firm  to  lts  workers.  6/
The  type  and  extent  of  the  traWning  on-the-job  given  btw)he  flrm  to  any-one  of
its  workers  will  be  ubknowmi  to  o2her  fLros.
In  contrast,  theofirm  actually,providing  the  training  will,  of
courso,  possess  relatively  full  information  regardlng  the  training  given  to
its  own  individual  workers.  Should  a  trained  rorker  change  his  employment,
him  new firm  will  have  conaiderably  less  Information  than  the  trainingOfi"r
about  the  on-the-job  general  tra  Ip  the  worker  poosesses.  Indeed,  the
central  tenet  upon  which  this  paper  is  based  is  that  there  qxists  this
uctrie  lnforlsomn  ak  ut  wore  rs  betwe4n-the  training  firm  and  a"
recruiting  firm.
Given  this  informatinnal  asymetry,  letr\s  consider  the
circumtances  under  which  this  asymetry  may bh  relevant  to  the  issuc  of
general  training  by  firm.  Two mjor  factors  are  of  Liportanwce,  iLrst,  theextent  to  wich  it  ii  possible  for  anew  firm  to  awsesJs qutckly  and cheply,
a ne  viwaker  s  lndividual  marginal  product.  Second,  the  speed -iLth  whi  the
recruiting  flrm  can  discove;  an  ind4ividual  worker's  level  of  trainLng.  We
consider  these  two  factors  ln  detail,  since  our  analysis  cruclally  depends  on
them.
Clearly,  the  asyemtry  of  in  -rustion  between  firms  Is  lrrelevant  lf
the  worker's  marglnal  product  in  easily  and  guLckly  determined,  because  the
Lnformation  about  a  worker's  level  of  training  ls,  in  effect,  only  a  proxy  for
knowledge  of  his  marginal  product.  If  the  actual  marginal  product  is  easily
diUcovered,  other  information  is  of  no  importance.  Since  our  paper  Is  based  on
the  assumptlon  that  informational  asy  etry  plays  a crucial  role  ln  the
provision  of  general  training,  our  analysis  holds  only  in  cases  where  a new
worker's  margLnal  product  is  teither  cheaply  nor  rapidly  determinri.
This,  however,  would  not  seen  to  be  a  major  restriction  on  the
validity  of  the  analysis.  Slnce  most wage  rates  in  the  economy  are  not  based
on  actual  output  or  a  visible  marginal  product,  our  assumption  that  trainlng
and other  indirect  information  is  of  iLportance  is  plausible  for  most jobs.
Indeed,  most  jobs  lnvolve  complex  and  different  roles,  the  marginal  product  of
which  cannot  be  measured directly.  Furthermore,  a  gXven  worker's  contribution
to  a  firm's  profits  may depend  on  his  interaction  with  others  as  well  as  on
the  marglnal  product  of  others.  This  dependence  of  a  worker's  product  on  both
horlzontal  and  vertical  factors  makes any  direct  or,  rapid  measurement of  his
product  well  nLgh  impossLble.
ConsLder  now  the  speed  with  which  a  recruiting  firm  can  discover  a
new  worker's  training  level.  Clearly,  if  it  is  both  rapid  and  cheap  to
discover  a  worker's  on-the-job  training  level,  then  the  asymmetry  ofinformation  between  firm  is  of  little  cone*qec.  7/  Thus'  our  anitlys1 
Implies  that  we  assu  on-the-job  traiting  information-to  be  costly  and/or
slow  to  obtain.  This  seems  a plaus  asumption  given  that  the  fastest
mathod of  determining  a worker'strainin_l  level  Is  probably  discovering  his
marginal  product.  In  addition,  most  labor  contracts  are,fairly  long.
suggesting  that  employers  may  not  benefit  from  shorter  ones,  and  this  Ln  turn
iMplies  a  long  discovery  period.  As  above  thorefore,  finding  out  training
lnformation  will  etcounter  obetacles,  such  as  job  complexity,  interaction
with  other  workers  and  so  on.
One more point  should  be  noted.  In  the  foregoing  analysis  w  assum
that  the  length  of  employment  Is  exogenous.  Thus  we  ozclude  jismissals,
probation  periods  end  other  devices  through  which  a  firm  aight  cut  its  losses
If  it  has  made  a  mistake  in  hiring  as  a  result  of  asyu.etric  information.  The
availabillty  of  such  devices  might  be  vie*ed  as  enabling  the  firm  to  hire  and
pay  workers  what  it  perceives  as  their  true  marginal  product  and  then  demote
or  dismiss  them  if  it  had  overestimated  their  skill.
However,  there  are  two  reasons  why  such  devices  miht  not  work.
First,  as  suggested,  there  may be  a  long  diseovery  period.  Second,  a
recruiting  firm  is  likely  to  pay  a  worker  a  little  less  than  him  actual
marginal  product,  until  the  end  of  the  discovery  process.  Duri*g  that  time
the  wage will  be  well  less  than  hls  maximal  marginal  product.  Hence  the  firm
need  not  cut  its  losses,  since-It  makes  none. This  works  as  follows:
Giving  the  worker  a  task  that  might  be  beyond  his  level  of  training
will  be  costly  to  the  recruiting  firm  in  terms  of  the  worker's  errors  of
judgement,  vasted  materials  and  so  on. Hence,  the  firm  will  tend  to  put  a  new
worker  into  a "least  damaging"  position,  which  will  tend  to  be  in  a  position7
roquird  a*alcs  skill  and  yielding  wag.  Wu.  This  impliex  ihat  X  ri  to
his  ultimte  (trairnin-b".e)  pOsition,  theIrdilvidual  vlll  be  given  lowt
leve  asigunats  aid'be  pro  g  less  th  *hisameisl  marginal  productQ
As  nor* iaformtloin  ri  this  will  revealed  to  the  recruitlntg  ~iru
over  tie,  the  vage  of  a  worker  can  be  expected,  to  rise  "  lnfonrmtion  about
his  traint"g  becomes  awvalable  to  tho  firm.  This  process  wvil  continue  until
the  workerts  wage  reach**-  "T,  when  the  wQrker  will  both  be  producing  and  seen
to  be  producing  at  hi*a  aaCIAa  0a0jinal  produCt,  MPT.
Since  a  new vowker's  marginal  product  is  likely  to  be  less  than  his
maximum,  the  recruiting  firm  does  not  necessarily  expropriate  (very  much  of) 8/
the  difference  between  the  wage  actually  paid  to  the  worker,  Up, and  the  wage,
VT,  wbich  is  equal  to  his  uamiL  matginal  product.  A new  recruit  will  in
general 9/  provide  a  smaller  outjut  to  the  recruiting  firm  than  he  did  in  the
training  firm.  From  this,  it  follows  that,  when  a  worker  changes  & place  of
employment,  a  social  dead-weight  loss  will  tend  to  occur,  This  social,  loss
can  be  viewed  as  the  cost  of  the  informational  asymetry
A  typical  productivity  perception  path  of  the  trained  worker  within
the  recruiting  firm  is  shown  in  Figure  1.  In  accordance  with  the  above
diseussdlri  the  worker  is  depicted  as  being  initially  viewed  by  the  recruiting
firm  as  untrained  and  put  into  a  position  requiring  no  training.  This  enables  =
him  to  produce  only  a  little  more  than  a  marginal  product  of  MPu, for  which  he
6btains  a  wage  Wu.  Then,  as  his  skills  are  discovered  by  the  firm  through
observation,  he is  moved  up  through  the  fiLr,  producing  and  receiving  an
increasing  marginal  product  and  wage  respectively,  until  he  ultimately
produces  MPT and  earns  VT.  As  suggested  above,  such  a  process  might  take  a
considerable  time  to  complete.?bus,  gsi"n  asy*mtric  information,  lNcker's  assumption  of  th
possibility  of  an  i_edot.  and  costle  s  transfer  of  workers  from  the  training
firm  to  other  firms  does  not  hold.  A'worker,  on, moving,  will  tend  to  suffer  a
wage  loss  due  to  the  recruiting  firm's  lack  of  knovledgp  of  his  background.
The  present  value  of  this  loss  when the  Interest  rate  is  zero  is  given  by  the
shadd  area  In  Figure  1.  Given  a  positLive  mrket interest  rate,  this  loss,
Lm, any be  written  as:
P  n  P  -it
L  -f  (V  - V  (t))&  dt,(1
o  T
where  n  is  the  complete  discovery  period  of  the  worker  in  the  recruiting  firm,
VT is  the  wage corresponding  to  the  worker's  true  skill,  WV(t)  is  the
discovered  skill  based  wage payable  to  the  worker  after  he  has  been  in
exployment  with  the  recruiting  firm  for  t  periods  and  i  is  the  market  rate  of
lnterest.  Using  our  earlier  assumption,  9('O)  - Vgu  equation  (1),  measuring
worker's  loss  on  changing  employmnt,  is  thus  seen  to  constitute  a  more
general  formulation  of  the  implicit  case  dealt  with  by  Backer.  Since  the
Blcker  modol  assumes  the  worker  incurs  no  earninag  loss  on  moving  to  the  new
firm,  it  implies  that  VT  V  VP(t)  for  all  t.  or,  in  terms  of  Figure  1,  that  the
productivity  perception  path  coincides  with the  ordinate  between  Vu and  VT.*  i  I-<
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III.  The  Tra_ninr  Firm  and  ShariXg  the  Bf
So much for  the  behavior  of  the  recruiting,  firm.  But  how might
trsinjig  firm  be  expected  to  act  in  view  of  all  this?  Assuming profit
maximizationw  ^as  long  as  the  rate  of  return,  r,  on  training  investments
sufficiently  exceeds  the  market  rate  of  interest,  i,  training  firms  will  have
an  incentive  to  invest  in  on-the-job  training.
In the  case  of  both  general  training  and  absence  of  asymmetric
information,  however,  firms  will  be  constrained  from  taking  advantage  of  this-.
type  of  investment  opportunity  because  of  the  need  to  pay  a  generally  trained
worker  a  wage  equal.to  his,enhanced  marginal  product  to  prevent  leaving  for
another  firm.  Thus,  the  training-investment  opportunities  are  passed  on  to
the  worker  who,  to  the  extent  that  he  -is  able  to  raise  finance  for  his
training,  both  pays  for,  and  reaps  the  earnings  benefits  of,  this  investment.
The presence  of  asyuetkc  information  and  the  potential  worker  loss
of  LP on  moving,  however,  render  the  inve,stment  in  general  training  by  the
firm  feasible,  and  indeed,  results  in  the  shariLg  of  the  general  training
investment  and  benefits  between  worker  and  firm.  In  this  case  the  firm  is
able  to  invest  4n  general  training  and  then,  after  the  completion  of  the
training  both  recoup  its  investment  and  earn  a  return  by  paying  the  trained
worker  a  wage  lower  than  his  marginal  product,  WT, without  necessarily
motivating  the  worker  to  move to  another  firm.  As  long  as  the  present  value
of  the  firm's  investment  plus  return  is  lower  than  LP,  the  firm  will  find  it
both  profitable  and  feasible  to  invest  in  general  training  since  this  wage
difference  will  not  cause  the  worker  to  leave  and  the  firm's  investment  in  the
worker  will  be  secure.  LP both  gives  scope  for,  and  acts  as  a  constraint  on,
the  training  firm's  ability  to  invest  in  general  training.11
The  constraint  emerges  because  we  can  deflne  the  firm's  general
training  investment  as  being  LO - this  being  that  part  of the  Lnvestment  in
general  traim*hg  that  the  worker  *loses*. Clearly,  LO cannot  exceed  LP (the
loss  the  worker  would incur  on  moving)  or else  the  worker  would  have a strong
lncentive  to  move to  a new  firm. Thus,  LP yields  the  upper  limit  on the
firm's  contributlon  to the  costs  of a  worker's  general  training. With
synmetric  information,  the  fLrm's  ability  to invest  in  a worker's  general
trainLig  is zero  whereas  when  the  information  is asymmetric.  LP is  strictly
positive  and  at least  some  general  training  by the  firm  is feasible.
In  addition,  the  worker  is unlikely  to  pay for  all  his general
training  (even  lf  he can  finance  it  and it  carries  a  high  return).  This  is  so
for  two  reasons. First:  glven  asymmetric  information,  it is  only  a  partially
transferrable  asset  and  should  he choose,  or  be obliged,  to change  firms  for
any  exogenous  reason  he  will lose  up to  LP.  Second:  given  that  the  firm  has
money,  which  it  has  still  not recovered,  invested  in  the  worker,  he is  more
likely  to  be kept  on ln  the  event  of  a downturn  in  business  or other
exogenously  caused  decllnes  in the  firm's  labor  demand. Asymmetric
information  therefore  can  enhance  the  interest  of  both  workers  and  training
flrms  ln agreelng  to  share  tralnlng  costs,  though,  of course,  there  is no  A
piLori  reason  to  believe  that  their  interests  will  coincide  in terms  of the
proportions  of tralning  to  be owned  by each  party.
Since,  the  present  value  of  the  benefits  from  training  the  marginal
worker  must  equal  the  costs,  the  training  firm  will  not  pay  more  than  LP for
the  indivldual's  general  training. From  this  it  follows  that:
LO - TF  5 LP  (2)12
where  TF  represents  that  part  of  total  investient,  $i  general  training  thjt  is
born,  by  the  firm.
If  the  ratio  of  firmn'  investment  in  general  training  (TF)  to  total
general  training  investment  is  given  by  a,  then  L°  is  measured  by
Lo  - &f(VT  W  aie  -it  (3)
0
where  a  is  the  expected  pumber of  years  of  service  of  the  worker  in  the  firm
and  the  worker  receives  a  post-training  wage WA, equal  to  UT - a (UT  - Wu).10/
As  noted  above,  L°  can  never  exceed  L  or  the  trained  worker  will
leave,  and  the  training  firm  will  forfeit  the  remaining  part  of  the  return  on
Its  share  of  the  training  investment.  This  loss  by  the  firm  will  apply  from
the  time  the  worker  leaves  until  period  . The worker,  on moving  to  a  new
finm,  will  also  lose,  but  the  loss  will  be  the  whole  of  LP  regaxdless  of  how
much time  has  elapsed  since  he  received  his  general  training.  In  addition,
given.  an  intention  to  move,  the  worker  will  have  lost  that  part  of  Lo  already
paid  back  to  the  training  firm  between  training  and  moving  Thus,  if  it  is  at
all  profitable  for  the  worker  to  move,  he  would  do  so  imediately  after
trainlag,  and  to  avoid  this  possibility  the  fim  muset  nsure  that,LO  c  LP
especlally  at  time  0.
We conclude  that  under  conditions  of  asymmetric  training
information,  worker  and  firm  may share  in  the  investment  in  general  training.
The  firm's  investment  will  be  bounded  above  by  LP  so  that  the  maxiam
proportlon  of  training  costs  contributed  by  the  firm  is  LF/T.  In  fact,  given13
the  finm's  desire  to  exploit  all  profitable  training  investment  possibilities,
it  will invest  all  it  can  in  general  training  (up  to  LP),  so  that  in  practice
LP will  tend  to  TF  and  a  will  tend  to  LP/T
There  is  an  additional  consideration  that  may encourage  firms  under
conditions  of  asymmetric  information  to  invest  in  general  training:  the  wage
it  pays  to the  worker  may,  in  itself,  act  as  a  partial  indicator  of  training
received,  since  it  will  usually  reflect  worker  productivity.  -Thus  in the
absence  of general  training  sharing,  a  worker  earning  his trained  wage  in  the
training  firm  and  switching  firms  may  be able  to  claim  an equivalent  wage  or
at  least  a  large  proportion  of  such  a  wage  and  not  suffer  the  full  loss  of
LP.  In  order  to  maintain  the  effect  of  asymmetrlc  information  and  conceal
training  information  from  recruiting  firms,  the  training  firm  will  be
encouraged  to  lower  the  actual  wage  paid  to  its  trained  workers  below  WT.
This  is,  of course,  precisely  vhat  happens  when the  fir*  takes  on part  of
general  training  investments  and  thus  buttresses  the  process  of training
sharing.
Indeed,  the  foregoing  discussion  produces  an  example  of  the  multi-
dimensional  tension  between  the  interests  of  firms  and  their  trainees.  The
trainee  clearly  prefers  a  training  which  makes him  visible,  provide.j  him  with
a  certificate  and  generally  identifies  him  outside  the  training  firni  as  well
trained. 1 1/  This  desire  to  achieve  potential  mobility  may in  fact  Lead  the
worker  to  select  a  form  of  training  (or  training  in  a  part  of  the  firs)  which
is  capable  of  yielding  these  signals.  The  firm,  on  the  other  hand,  1has an
interest  in  keeping  information  regarding  the  worker's  training  level  low,  by
avoiding  training  visibility,  certification  and  so  on.  Thus  the  type  of
training  offered  by  firms  and  chosen  by  workers  may  be  varied,  subject  to  the14
constraint  of  available  courses  a.nd methods  of  training,  and  will  in  turn
influence  the  degree  of  firs  sharing  in  training,  since  clearly,  the  more
O"obile"  ts the  worker's  skills  acquired  through  training,  the  lower  will  be
the  scope  for  the  firm's  sharing  in the  training  investment  and  vice-versa. 12/.w,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,
IV.  R~ma  naoim WA-  Furtbir,  Imamso
The  1ole  Of  nAtura  abL4Itro
In  addition  to  there  being  asynstric  informatipn  between  firma
vis-a-vis  training,  thete  is  likely  to  be  a  difference  in  the  information  , 
available  to firmt'regarding  individual  worker's  natural  ability. Training
firms  are  obviously  likely  to  have  better  information  regarding  natural
ability,  and  this  adds  anvther  dimension  of  informational  asyuetry  to  the
asymetrK due  to training.  How does  the  Introduction  of  natural  ability
affect  our  1;sults?
It seems  likely  that  infoquation  asymmetry  concerning  natural
ability,  will  tend  to  *tren-th-n  our  results.  As argued  earlier,  lack  of
knowledge  about  a  worker  implies  that  a  recruiting  firm  is  likely  to  start  him,
off  at  an  unskilled  level.  When natural  ability  is  added  to  the  issueo  the
recruiting  firm  could  be twice  wrong. This  is  because  the  training  firm  will
possess  two  different  pteces  of information  about  the  worker,  whiereas  the
recruiting  firm  will  possess  none.  this  will  reduce  even  lurther  the  desire
of  a  trained  worker  of  any  given  natural  ability  level  to  move  to  the
recruiting  firm,  since  he  will  be  losing  on  both  counts.
In  addition,  the  issue  of  natural  ability,  by  making  the
identification  of  an individual  worker's  traits  more  difficult,  is likely  to
reduce  the  value  of information  the  recruiting  firm  is  able  to glean  from  the
training  firm.  For  example,  if  workers  were  homogeneous  the  wage structure
and its  relation  to training  would  soon  be learnt  by a  recruiter. Since
workers  are,  however,  heterogeneous  in  natural  ability,  both their  training
costs  and/or  the  post-training  marginal  costs  are  likely  to  vary from  worker
to  worker,  thus  bringing  about  different  wages  to  each  worker  and  making  the16
relation  between  marginal  product  and-wages  very  difficult  to  discer>.  (Note
that  workers  pay  for  their  training  with  reduced  wages  and  that  the  reduction
of  wages  of  any  one  worker  depends  on  hid  speed  of  learning  and  other  natural
traits).
Asymmetric  information  and  minimum wa,  re  IggISt
The presence  of  asymmetric  information  does  more  than  lead  to  a
sharing  of  general  training  investment  by  worker  and  firm;  it  may  also  negate
factors  which  lead  to  market  failure  in  the  form  of  under-investment  in
general  training.  For  example,  in  the  model  with  symmetric  information  the
worker  must  pay  for  all  his  training  costs  in  t1.  form  of  lower  wages  durisng
the  relative short  training  geriod,  since  presumably  he  will  leave  the  firm
If  he  hes  to  pay  for  any  training  after  his  training  is  concluded.  The  need
:o  pay  for  his  training  over  this  short  period  will  make his  payments  high
(and  his  net  wages  low).  Minimum  wage  legislation  may  act  as  a  constraint  on
worker-financed  general  training  if  the  minimum  wage  is  set  at  a  level
exceeding  that  of  the  net  wage  to  be  received  by  the  worker  during  the
training  period  (Hashimoto,  1975).  This  is  because  the  undertaking  by  workers
of  a  sizeable  amount  of  training  ;osts,  to  be  paid  back  over  a  short  time,
might  bring  their  net  wage  - namely  the  wage  minus  the  payment  for  training  -
below  the  minimum  wage,  thus  legally  constraining  the  employers  from  allowing
workers  to  undertake  (and  pay  for)  so  much investment.  The slack  investment
would  not,  given  symmetric  information,  be  undertaken  by  the  training  fLrm  and
this  leads  to  a "training  gap"  which  may  imply  socially  suboptimal  general
training  and  a  welfare  loss.
However,  the  sharing  of  the  training  investment  between  the  firm  and
the  worker  which  is  made  possible  by  asymmetric  information,  implies  a  lower17
iLestmoent  by  workers.  This  in  turn  mean  smaller  payments  by  wiorkers  and
higher  wages.  T6se  high8e  wages  are  less  likely  to  contravene  minimum eage
regulations.  Hence,  paradoxically,  training  investment  by  the  firm  may  permit
training  investment  by  workers  13/
-kzo"anous  leavin 1 :"
The  possibility  that  a  worker,  may  leave  the  training  firm  for
exogenous  reasons,  I.e.  those  unrelated  to  the  income  in  the  training  firm  ai
compared  with  a  new  firm,  has  implications  for  our  model.  Such  exogenous
reasons  could  include  a  chnge  in  marital  status.  health,  a  move  to another
city  and  so  on,  Clearly,  when  investment  in  training  is  shared,  both  the
worker  and  the  training  firm  lose  out.  The  worker  los18  since  he  must  nov
start  from  scratch  and  suffer  the  loss  of  at least  LP;  the  firm  loses  because
it  does  not  recoup  all  of  its  training  invettment,  Tp.  Thus  both  parties  have
an  incentive  to  minimize  the  likelihood  of  exogenous  leaving  of  a  firm  by  a
worker. 1 4/
Alternatively  the  firm  and  the  worker  can  depart  from  a  linear
sharing  arrangement  as  in  (3),  towards  a  sharing  agreement  in  which  the  share
of  the  training  firm  In  the  worker's  training  based  wage  is,  in  the  early
post-training  periods,  In  excess  of  4, i.e.,  the  fir.  will  tend  to  get  more  of
its  investment  plus  return  early  on.  Hence,  defining  W°(t)  as the  wage  at
time  t,  this  agreement  would  involve,  for  low  values  of  t,  WO(t)  < WA  where,
as  defined  above,  WA is  the  wage  representing  the  constant  sharing  of  benefits
arrangement  underlying  (3).  Subsequently,  V°(t)  will  exceed  WA.
Thus,  the  present  value  of the  "loss"  to the  worker  from  this
arrangement  is  given  by  LO where> - 1J
0  w L° - f  (VT  - °())-dl  (4)
0
This,is  a  general  form  of  (3),  and  hete  tho  wage.,  (W(t))  and  dIuration  of-the
sharing  agreunt,  (P),  are  chosen  by  negotiation.
flxllyr,  Ire  consider  a  furhr  implication  of  the  possibility  that
the  worker  may leae  for  ex#genous  reasons.  The  firm  may reduce  this  risk  by
making  the  paynt.to  the  worker  pertly  non-tranferable  and  non-usable  until
he  has  bWn  euplo$ed  for  some yegrs.  A geeous  pension  plan  night  do  tbo
trick  here.  Indeed,  as  we have  Ugsiited  alfewhere  (Katz  and  Ziderman,  1987),
a  pensLon  plan,,  a  housing  loan,  school  subsidies,  may all  be  seen  as  methods
of  causing  thoxe  workerx  self  selecting  to  apply  to',the  firm,  to  be  more risk
averse  indlviduals.  This  reduces  their  mobility  to  new firms  about  whLch they
have  less  information  than  their  current  one,  and  thus  helpi  safeguird  the
firm's  training  investment.
Effects_of  chanaLng ite0rst  rAtes:
A further  issue  emerges  when interest  rates  rhange;  a  change  in  the
rate  of interest  will  at  times  affect  LP  differently  from  LO and  thus  alter
their  ratio.  Interest  rates  rising  fairly  soon  after  training  may cas  LP  to
fall  by  a  relatively  large  amount whilst  the  remainder  of  LO way decline  by  a
relatively  small  amount.  This  might  then  pause  the  remainder  of  LO  to  exceed
LP,  forcing  the  fLrm  to  raise  wages  and  ircurring  a  loss  on its  general
training  iuvestmeit,  TF  15/  A paradoxlcal  phenomenon might  then,occur  wherg
an  iicreaae  in,interest  rate  raises  the,wages  of  certain  parts  of  the  labor
force.  Thls  problem  may be  solved  if,  atJleast  at  the-early  stages  of  the
post  training  perlod,  LO is  made,to  follov  as  closely  as  possibite  the  ties
path  of  LP  or 4in  any  event,  the  financial  arrangements  of  the  early  post19
training  period  are  rendered  less  sensitLvo  to  interest  rat-e,  perhaps  by
methods  whiob  have  been  developed  In  the  finance  litoratero  (see  Weston  and
Copeland,  1983  pp.  434-437).
Capital  makt  ,
The  inability  of  workers  to  finance  their  training  because  of  a  lack
of  funds  or  a  lack  of  acces!.  ,to  capital  markets  may  bd  circumvented  if
asynpmtric  training  information  is  present.  Sinee  firms  share  in  general
training  investments,  a  smaller  burden  of  the  finance  of  training  falls  on  the
worker,  onabling  hLi to train. This factor  is  especially  iWportant  in
developing  countries  where  capital'markets  may  be partial  or missing
altogether. In  the  absence  of  asymetric  information  on  the  oth(k'  hand
training  may  not take  place  because  of the  worker's  lack  of suitable
collateral  and  the  firm's  inability  to  provide  a  training  loan  to  the  worker
because  of  the  difficulty  of  ensuring  loan  repayments.  Asymmetric  information
may  thus  solve  the  problem  of  market  tailure  in  the  investment  in  gener4a
training.
Trainina  sharin  vs.  loan  agree_mnts:
The  consideration  of  capital  marketnconp&fiai&ts  introduces  a  new
element  lnto  our  discussion  of training  shiring.-  Whereas  asymmetric
information  will  do nothing  to ease-worker  access  to external  loan  markets,  it
am  make  possible  the  offering  of  . loan  to the  worker  by the,firm  to finance
the  general  training  of the  worker,  as an altarnative  to sharing  the  benefits
of training. Firms,  and  especially  large  ones  which  possess  goo*  credit
worthiness  and  sufficient  collateral,  as  well  as possibly  having  implicit  or
explicit  government  guarantees  against  default,  are  likely  to  be able to
obtain  such  funds.16/20
Finally,  consider  .h  percept(on  of  L--and  the, possible  tonsions
between  the  training  firm  and  the  trainee  In  regard  to  this.  It  transpires
that  the  way in  which  tho  worker  will  want  the  firm  to  view  LP may crucially
depend  on  whether  the  worker  and  the  firm  are  partners  in  paying  for,  and
reaping  the  rewards  of,  the  worker's  training  ot  whether  the  worke,r,  as  is  the
case  just  considered,  essentially  borrows  the  money for  training  from  his
firm. 17/  If  training  is  essentially  An livestment  sharing  procedure  whlch,
following  most  of  the  literature,  is  the  assumption  adopted  In  this  paper,  the
worker  will  wish  to  own  as  large  a  share  as  possible  in  the  training
investment  subject  to  his  desire  that  some  of  the  risks  of  training  alluded  to
above  are  borne  by  the  firm.  To do  this  he  will  attempt  to  dissuade  the  firm
from  participating  in  the  training  investment  by  painting  LP to  be  as  small  as
possible.  This  he  can  do by  emphasizing  to  his  training  firm  those  factors
that  might  scirve  as  a  training  signal  to  a  recruiting  firm. Such signals  may
include  visibility  in  his  job,  formal  scholastic  and  training  certificates  he
might  be  able  to  obtain  in  his  spare  time,  imd  word  of  mouth  information  from
firm  to  firm.  In  addition,  the  worker  might  try  to  convince  the  firm  that  the
exogenous  probability  of  his  leaving  is  not  insignificant,  to  further  motivate
the  firm  to  reduce  its  investment  share.
However,  once  the  worker  has  been  trained,  he  would  like  to  squeeze
the  training  firm  still  further  by  pointing  out  that  LP is  even  smaller  than
previously  described,  so  that  the  training  firm  would  have  to  raise  his  wage
to  avoid  his  leaving.  Thus,  both  prior  to  and  after  his  training  he  may have
an  incentive  to  reduce  the  training  firm's  perception  of  LP as  well  as  to
increase  its  perception  of  the  probability  of  his  exogenous  leaviuig. 18/21
Contrast  the  above  with  tho  case  in  which  tho  worker  rceriyOs  a  loan
-'  from  the  firm  for,the  pt*oses  of  financing  his  training,  rather  than  entering
into  a  sharing  agreemnt  with  the  firm.  In  this  case  his  motivation  is  to
iaxluizo  the  loan  by  Lncreasing  the  training  firm's  perception  of  LI' beforo  he
is  trained,  but  to  press  the  firm  for  higher  wages  by  reducing  the  firm's
perception  of  his  LP  after  he  has  beon  hired.
Thus,  whereas  the  sharing  agreemnt  leads  to  a  similar  behavior
pattern  of  the  worker  both  before  and  after  training,  a  loan  from  the  firm  to




In  this  paper  we  shcvwhat  firm  will  assum  a  role  In  finncin;  the
general  training  of  their  workers,  if  training  information  is  asymti'ic-
between  training  and  recruiting  flrm.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  the  classic
Becker  result  that  fiLms will  finance  only  specific  training  bectase  it  Is
non-trapsferable  to  other  firms ,  the  inability  of  recruiting  firms  to
iamediately  recognize  the  general  traiiing  level  of  a  new forker  makes general
training  only  partially  transferable  (or  only  transferable  in  the  longer  run)
and  thus  gives  training  firms-motivation  to  invest  in  it.
The main  iuplication  of  this  result  is  that  the  general  training
issue  becomes,  given  asysmtric  information,  a  central  decision  variable  of
che  firm.  The extent  of  the  firm's  participation  in  the  finance  of  general
training,  the  type  of  general  trainisg  financed,  the  choice  of  landing  workers
money  to  train  as  opposed  to  being  partners  In  the  training  investment,  the
interaction  of  training  risk  (in  workers  of  unknown quality)  with  other  risks
and  indeed  the  long  run  wage  profile  of  a  worker  with  general  training  as  a
functio'  ¶ the  firm's  extent  and  type  of investment  in  his training,  all
become,  given  our  analysis,  part  of  the  micro-economic  theory  of  the  firm  and
its  legitimate  realm  of  A;udy.23
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1.  Of course,  the  cost  of  the  training  may exceed  earnings  during  the
training  period.  Alternatively,,  the  reduction.of  earnings  by  the
cost  of  training  may  contravene  minimum  wage  laws. In  both  these
cases  general  training  may  not  be  feasible  even  if  it  is  to  be
financed  by  the  worker.  A fuller  discussion  of  this  issue  is  given
in  Section  IV;  the  traditional  Beckerian  theory  of  training,  and
applications,  are  outlined  in  Ziderman  (1978).
2.  There  are,  however,  some  dissenting  voice,:  see  Donaldson  and  Eaton,
1976  and  Mortensen,  1978. A formal  analysis  of  the  specific
training  cost  sharing  model  is  provided  by  Hashimoto,  1981.
3.  This  is  particularly  relov&At  for  cases  where  the  pay  back  period  on
-training  investment  is  -7/ery  short  so  that  training  costs  may  be
recouped  within  a  relcively  short  period  following  training  (for
some evidence  on  this  see  Ziderman,  1969).
4.  Internal  labor  mara1z.s  (Doeringer  and  Poire  1971),  implicit  contract
theory  (Azariadis  1975,  Hashimoto  1975),  labor  hoarding  (Taylor
1974),  turnover  and  quit  rates  (Parsons  1972,  Pencavel  1972,
altiwanger  1983)  to  list  but  a  few  of  these  areas  in  which  the
specific  training  concept  plays  a  central  role.
5.  See,  however  Rosen's  1972  paper,  viewing  the  general  training
process  in  terms  of  an  implicit  market  for  training  and  learning
opportunities  that  is  dual  to  the  market  for  jobs. That  paper
constitutes  one  of  the  notable  developments  of  the  theory  of  general
training.
6.  This  difficulty  of  cbtaihing  information  about,  and  measuring  the
extent  of,  on-the-job  training  in  firms  is  also  reflected  in  the
amount of  data  about  this,  which  remain,  at  best,  sparse.  In
addition,  attempts  by  economists  at  measuring  global  costs  of  such
training  have  k*d  to  be  indirect  and  approximate,  reflecting  once
again  the  difficulties  outsiders  have  in  assessing  on-the-job
training  programs  (See,  for  example,  the  classic  studies  of  Mincer
1962,  1974).
7.  The case  of  a  worker's  arginal  product  being  easily  determined  is
clearly  a  special  case  of  general  information  about  workers,  being
quickly  and  cheaply  discovered.
8.  Since  the  worker  is  better  than  the  job  he  is  doing,  he  will  be
producing  a little  more  than  the  typical  worker  at  that  level.  This
surplus,  which  is  a  signal  that  he  is  better  trained  thkin  his  job
and  should  be  promoted,  is  profit  to  the  firm.26
9.  Note that  the  shaded  area  measures  the  social  loss  of the  worker's
move.  Of course,  it  might  be argued  that  based  upon  its  long-term
experience,  the  recruiting  firm  may  be aware  that  newly  recruited
workers  do,  on average,  arrive  with  some  amount  of training  and
natural  ability  and  hence,  that  it  might  pay  such  a  worker  a
somewhat  higher  wage than  Wu which  takes  into  account  the
possibility  that  the  new  worker  may  have  received  general  training.
This  means  that  a  new  and (unknown)  worker  would  be paid somewhere
in  between  WT and  Wu until  his training  level  is ascertained.  Note
however,  that  this  practice  is  unlikely  to occur:  paying  unknown
workers  above  Wu will  have  negative  self  seleclion  effects  as well
as cause  resentment  amongst  the  firm's  original,  untrained
employees. In addition,  this  practice  might  cause  firms  major
longer  run  problems.  Given  that  (nominal)  wages  are  downward
sticky,  a  recruiting  firm  may  have  difficulty  in  reducing  the  wage
of  the  untrained  worker  to  Wu once  he  is  discovered  to  be  untrained.
Inflation,  which  erodes  the  real  wage  value  of  nominal  wages,  may  be
one  solution  to this  problem,  though  not  necessarily  a  reliable  or
timely  one.  Starting  all  workers,  however  briefly,  at  Wu,  may
therefore  still  be a better  practice,  especially  given  the
mismatching  problem.
10.  For  convenience,  we have  assumed  that  training  is instantaneous  so
that  the  relevant  time  span  for  the  worker's  productive  years  in the
training  firm  is  0 to  m.  Other  assumptions  which  allows  training  to
take  some  time  need  not  alter  the  essence  of our  results.
11.  For  an interesting  application  of the  concept  of worker  visibility,
in  another  context,  see  Milgrom  and  Oster (1987).
12.  One  solution  to this  problem  of  visibility  and  certification  may  be
an implicit  agreement  between  the  training  firm  and its  employees:
once  the  firm  has  recovered  its  investment  in  general  training  the
worker  w:ll  be employed  more  visibly  (sent  to  conferences,  employed
in demonstrating  the  firm's  products  etc.). Furthermore  at this
time  the  worker  may  be given  certificates  and  other  evidence  of
excellence  at his  job.
13.  The issue  may,  nonetheless,  not  be completely  solved  by the  firm's
ability  to  share  in  training  costs. This is  because  the  firm  faces
another  constraint  on its  investment  sharing,  namely  LP,  as
discussed  above. Hence,  the  firm's  maximal  investment  Tp(-LP)  plus
the  worker's  legally  permissible  investment  (i.e.  that  which  would
bring  him  down  to thie  minimum  legal  wage)  may  still  fall  short  of
the  amount  required  to  pay for  the  full  training  desired.  Thus,
whilst  given  minimum  wage legislation  under  asymmetric  information
as  compared  with symmetric  information,  will  always  reduce  the
training  gap  some  part  of this  training  gap  may  nonetheless  persist.
14.  In  addition  the  firm  may  protect  itself  by reducing  LP through
choosing  a  higher  discount  rate  to take  account  of the  exogenous
leaving  risk. This,  of course,  will  reduce  the  amount  of  a worker's27
general  training  invested  in  by the  firm.
15.  If interest  rates  fall,  the  training  firm  could,  conceivably,  reduce
wages  and still  keep  the  worker. Given  the  downward  stickiness  of
wages,  however,  this  seems  unlikely  to  occur. Hence,  immunization
against  interest  rate  changes  will increase  the  firm's  profitability.
16.  Clearly  those  firms  that  are  capable  of financing  the  training  of
their  workers  by acting  as financial  intermediaries  are  likely  to  be
large  rather  than  small  or intermediate  in  size.  The  trainers  of
workers  are, therefore,  going  to  be sizable,  well established  firms
whereas  the  firms  mainly  recruiting  trained  workers  are  likely  to  be
small,  with  relatively  little  in  the  way  of  financial  assets.  This
process  will  be reinforced  if  there  are  economies  of scale  in the
training  of  workers,  a factor  that-will  offer  a cost  advantage  to
larger  firms  in  the  training  of  workers.
17.  In the  literature  it is generally  assumed  that  training  loans  by
firms  and investment  in training  by the  firm  are  equivalent: see,
for  example,  Fleisher  and  Knieser,  1984,  pp. 334-6.
18.  Note,  however,  that  this  will  not  be labored  or the  worker  may  not
get  the  job  or  training  at  all,  on  the  grounds  of  the  firm's  hiring
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